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TORTS-GUEST STATUTE-THE "MINORS OF TENDER
YEARS" EXCEPTION NOW COURT-MADE LAW
IN ILLINOIS
On December 26, 1959, Holly Ann Rosenbaum, a minor four years of
age, had her finger crushed by the rear door of Donna Raskin's automo-
bile as Holly was attempting to enter the back seat. Holly entered the
automobile at the invitation of the defendant, but without the express per-
mission of her parents. A suit was subsequently filed, based solely on a
theory of ordinary negligence. Plaintiff contended that the guest statute'
was not applicable to minors of tender years and the jury agreed, returning
a verdict in Holly's favor.
On appeal, the court reversed the jury's verdict, and remanded the
case for new trial. That court held that a minor under the age of seven
may be a "guest" within the guest statute, the result hinging on actual or
implied parental consent. 2  Thereafter, plaintiff was granted leave to ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, where her case was consolidated
with Ragon v. Ragon.3
Charles Ragon, three years of age, died in an automobile collision neg-
ligently caused by Ross Ragon and Melvin Brock. Subsequently, an ac-
tion was brought by Alfred Ragon, Charles' administrator, alleging, inter
alia, a separate count of negligence against each defendant. The negli-
gence count against defendant Ragon was dismissed by the circuit court,
which held that plaintiff-guest would have to allege and prove wanton and
wilful misconduct 4 against his host. Plaintiff appealed directly to the
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 9-201 (1969). The Illinois guest statute provides
as follows: "No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest
without payment for such ride, or while engaged in a joint enterprise with the
owner or driver of such motor vehicle or motorcycle, nor his personal representative
in the event of the death of such guest, shall have a cause of action for damages
against the driver or operator of such motor vehicle or motorcycle, or its owner or
his employee or agent for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such
accident shall have been caused by the willful and wanton misconduct of the driver
or operator of such motor vehicle or motorcycle or its owner or his employee or
agent and unless such willful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought." (Emphasis added).,
2. Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill. App. 2d 469, 243 N.E.2d 616 (1969).
3. Rosenbaum v. Raskin and Ragon v. Ragon, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100
(1970); heretofore referred to as the Rosenbaum case, and the Ragon case.
4. Supra note 1.
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supreme court; there, his case was consolidated for opinion with Rosen-
baum.5
In this case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
both decisions, holding that the Illinois guest statute was not applicable to
minors of tender yearsA Rosenbaum v. Raskin and Ragon v. Ragon, 45
Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E. 2d 100 (1970).
This decision is significant because the Illinois Supreme Court has, for
the first time, carved out of the guest statute an exception for minors of
tender years-an exception not expressly warranted by the terms of the
statute itself. This note will trace the origin, construction and application
of guest statutes, as well as the court-formulated exceptions which have
resulted in the preferred status of certain classes. Finally, the current
trend of the courts in interpreting and applying their guest statutes will be
discussed, as well as any possible future applications.
Prior to the enactment of a "guest statute," the courts employed the
common law rule which drew no distinction between the "guest" and a
"passenger." The driver or owner of a motor vehicle owed the mere
duty to refrain from recklessly exposing the guest or passenger to any
hazards or dangers that might cause injury.7 Under the common rule, no
distinction was made between an adult and a minor with respect to the
degree of care required of the driver or owner of an automobile. 8  The
distinction between adults and minors became meaningful only after guest
statutes had been enacted.
The 1920's and 1930's formed the historical setting in which the first
5. Supra note 3, at 25, 257 N.E.2d at 101. "The issues being basically identi-
cal, the causes are consolidated for opinion."
6. Supra note 3, at 33, 257 N.E.2d at 104. This decision has already been
followed by the Appellate Court in Illinois, in the case of Cox v. Nicholes, 122
Ill. App. 2d 252, 258 N.E.2d 394 (1970). This was an action brought by the
administrator of the estate of a six-year-old child against his mother's estate. The
deaths resulted when a train struck the car that mother was driving. The lower
court dismissed the case, finding only ordinary negligence, and stating that the
child was a guest within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, could only collect
upon the showing of wanton and willful misconduct. This appellate court followed
the decision set down in the Rosenbaum case and stated, "the guest statute was
not intended to apply to a child of tender years."
7. Galloway v. Perkins, 198 Ala. 658, 73 So. 956 (1916); Sheean v. Foster,
80 Cal. App. 56, 251 P. 235 (1926); Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E.
169 (1925); Redfern v. Redfern, 212 Iowa 454, 236 N.W. 399 (1931), which
applied Illinois law; Trosper v. Lawson, 248 Ky. 341, 58 S.W.2d 632 (1933);
Garrity v. Mangan, 232 Iowa 1188, 6 N.W.2d 292 (1942).
8. See Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 250 N.W. 441 (1933), which dealt
with a five-year-old girl; Bohren v. Lautenschlager, 239 Wis. 400, 1 N.W.2d 792(1942).
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guest statutes were enacted.9 These statutes were centered about the
distinction between a passenger for hire and a gratuitous passenger, com-
monly referred to as a "guest." The degree of care required of the driver
or owner would vary, and be ultimately determined by, the status of his
passenger. To a passenger for hire, e.g., a passenger in a taxi cab, the
driver or owner would be liable for damages caused by his negligence.
Proof of more than ordinary negligence would be required to hold the
driver or owner liable to a guest. Breach of this higher degree of care
was usually referred to as "wanton and wilful misconduct," "gross negli-
gence," or a "total and reckless disregard" of the rights of the passengers.' 0
Even without a guest statute, some states have nevertheless upheld the
theory requiring a guest to prove wanton and wilful misconduct in order
to recover from his host." For example, in Massaletti v. Fitzroy,'
2
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts drew a distinction between
a guest and a passenger stating:
Justice requires that one who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously should
not be under the same measure of obligation as one who enters upon the same
9. During the 1920's and 1930's twenty-seven states passed the now called,
"guest statute," which limited the liability of a host to his guest. The limitation
was that the host no longer would be liable to a guest for ordinary negligence.
Each statute sets out its own criteria or requirement which a guest must allege prior
to recovery from his host. See Appendix which was taken from Comment, Judicial
Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 854, 899-901 (1968).
10. The first "guest statutes" were put into effect in 1927 by Connecticut, Iowa,
and Oregon. See Appendix for the remaining states. Also see generally, Note:
41 IOWA L. REV. 648 (1956).
11. Massachusetts and Georgia are two states that permit the same conclusion
as that of a "guest statute" by case law rather than by the passage of a "guest
statute." See Georgia: Hopkins v. Sipe, 58 Ga. App. 511, 199 S.E. 246 (1938);
Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921); Massachusetts: Palden v.
Crook, 342 Mass. 173, 172 N.E.2d 686 (1961); Cook v. Cole, 273 Mass. 557, 174
N.E. 271 (1931); Jacobson v. Stone, 277 Mass. 323, 178 N.E. 636 (1931); Baker
v. Hurwitch, 265 Mass. 360, 164 N.E. 87 (1928); Marcienowski v. Sanders, 252
Mass. 65, 147 N.E. 275 (1925); Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E.
168 (1917); West v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183, 81 N.E. 960 (1907). In Massachusetts
when dealing with minors, the courts found that minors were not exempted from
alleging and proving "gross negligence" prior to recovery as a guest against a host.
See Marshall v. Carter, 301 Mass. 372, 17 N.E.2d 205 (1938); Balian v. Ogassin,
277 Mass. 525, 179 N.E. 232 (1931). Washington: Washington, prior to the
passage of a "guest statute" still followed the theory of a "guest statute." See
Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655, 247 P. 1034 (1926); Saxe v. Terry, 140
Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926). The above cases were prior to the enactment of a
"guest statute." In Upchurch v. Hubbard, 29 Wash. 2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947),
the court expresses the reasoning of the legislature in passing a guest statute, "the
purpose of that statute was to prevent collusive action between host and guest, com-
mitted with the intent to defraud casualty insurance companies.... "Id. at 566-67,
188 P.2d at 86.
12. Supra note 11.
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undertaking for pay. There is an inherent difficulty in stating the difference be-
tween the measure of duty which is assumed in the two cases [between guest and
passenger]. But justice requires that to make out liability in case of gratuitous
undertaking the plaintiff ought to prove a materially greater degree of negligence
than he has to prove where the defendant is to be paid for doing the same thing.' 3
Thus, it would appear that justice requires different treatment for paying
and non-paying passengers.
Although the Massaletti court found this interpretation of justice to be
persuasive, the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Clark v. Storchak14
relied exclusively on the legislative purpose behind the guest statute' 5 in
reaching its decision, although the result was language strikingly similar
to Massaletti:
That there should be a difference between the liability of a person who, out of the
generosity of his heart, renders gratuitously some service to his fellow traveler over
those rendering such service for hire and barter, can hardly be questioned. Those
who are charitably inclined should not be restrained by fear of the consequences of
their own charitable act and the recipients should not be permitted to gain by the
generosity of their host. . . . [G]enerous drivers might find themselves involved
in litigation that often turned upon questions of ordinary negligence. It was evi-
dently the intention of the legislature not only to correct this abuse but to promote
the best interests of the people in their relation to each other. .... 16
This reasoning has similarly been expressed in a number of Illinois deci-
sions, both before and after Clark.17
Cases like Clark and Massaletti underline one primary reason for the
enactment of guest statutes in derogation of the common law-the hos-
pitality of the gratuitous host."' There is, however, a further reason for
guest statutes-the possibility of collusive lawsuits between driver and
guest. 19
Both rationales are stated in Stephan v. Proctor,20 a California case in
which the appellate court declared:
13. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, supra note 11 at 510, 118 N.E. at 177.
14. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943), cert. den. 322
U.S. 713 (1944).
15. Supra note 1.
16. Supra note 14, at 579, 52 N.E.2d at 237.
17. See Miller v. Miller, 395 I11. 273, 69 N.E.2d 878 (1946); Connett v. Winget,
374 Ill. 531, 30 N.E.2d 1 (1940).
18. Supra note 3, at 102. "[T]his court has so applied the Illinois guest
statute, ever mindful, however, that, being in derogation of the common law, it is to
be strictly construed." See also Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478
(1935); Hunter v. Baldwin, 268 Mich. 106, 255 N.W. 431 (1934); Ille v. Lamphere,
60 Ohio App. 4, 18 N.E.2d 989 (1938).
19. For a general discussion of both reasons and a history see: Comment, 19
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 281 (1941); Comment 41 IowA L. REV. 648 (1956); Comment,
41 So. CAL. L. REV. 884 (1968).
20. 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965).
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The primary policy underlying the guest statute is to prevent recovery for ordinary
negligence by a guest who has accepted the hospitality of the owner. A secon-
dary policy, of course, is to prevent collusive suits between friends where the driver
admits negligence in order to shift the burden to his insurance carrier. 2 1
These reasons have led to the enactment of guest statutes in a total of
twenty-seven states; at present, there are two states which have guest
statutes in theory only; the remainder, a substantial minority, retain the
common law rule. 22
Mere passage of guest statutes was not the end-all of the problem, as
they were soon attacked on due process constitutional grounds. For ex-
ample, the 1927 Oregon guest statute was attacked on the grounds that
the statute allowed no cause of action by a guest against his host. Ac-
cordingly, in the case of Stewart v. Houk,23 this statute was struck down.
Thereafter, in 1929, Oregon passed its current guest statute.24  This
statute was likewise challenged in the case of Perozzi v. Ganiere;25 this
time, however, it was upheld as being a valid exercise of the state's police
power. Kansas 26 and Connecticut 27 have also had their guest statutes
21. Id. at 230, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 125. This case has combined both reasons in
its evaluation. Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d 101 (1947)
based its reasoning on the collusion argument. In Rocha v. Hulen, supra note 18,
at 254, 44 P.2d at 482, the court expressed its thoughts on the legislative purpose for
enacting a "guest statute:" "The legislature, at the time of enacting the section
referred to [guest statute], evidently had in mind the redress of an obvious wrong, to
wit, the readiness with which both driver and guest would pool issues to exact
tribute from an insurance company." So protecting the insurance companies who are
the real defendants, from collusion, because it is easier for the driver to admit to
ordinary negligence than it is for him to admit to "gross negligence,". "wanton and
willful misconduct," or "drunkeness," which might carry with them other penalties,
revocation of drivers license or possible criminal charges. As to the question of
hospitality, many courts have used it as its basic reasoning. Shelby v. Hagood, 182
Call. App. 2d 760, 6 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1960); Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal. App. 2d 742,
306 P.2d 30 (1957); Martinez v. Southern Pac. Ry., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868
(1955); Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950); and in Craw-
ford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841, 843 (1930), the court stated its
reason as being compared to the old saying, don't bite the hand that feeds you.
22. See Appendix for the 27 states; for the two states who haven't passed a
"guest statute" but still require the same degree of care see supra note 11.
23. 127 Ore. 589, 271 P. 998 (1928).
24. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 30.115 (1960).
25. 149 Ore. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935). The police power argument was also
expressed in Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936) where the court
stated: "[I]n the exercise of such power, may prescribe laws tending to promote
the health, peace, morals, education, good order and welfare of the people . . . [it]
is an attribute of sovereignty, an essential element of the power to govern ....
Id. at 153, 53 P.2d at 619.
26. Wright's Estate v. Pizel, 168 Kan. 493, 214 P.2d 328 (1950).
27. Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928).
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challenged, but, as in Oregon, the statutes were upheld as being a valid
exercise of police power.
Upon recognizing the constitutionality of guest statutes, the problems
now facing the courts were those of application and interpretation. The
first of these problems was the genesis of the host-guest relationship itself,
but courts soon began to utilize two basic criteria to aid them in their solu-
tion.
These two criteria, which of necessity must be implemented simultane-
ously, are: (1) that the guest-host relationship is based upon the hos-
pitality of the host, and not payment; and (2) that this relationship must
be voluntarily accepted by the passenger. Both criteria were employed
in the Rosenbaum decision:28 "The term guest, as used in the statute,
contemplates some sort of extension of hospitality and an acceptance
thereof as a requisite of that status."'29
In the case of Conne tt v. Winget,a0 another Illinois Supreme Court de-
cision, the court elucidated further on the application of the criteria:
[I]f it confers only a benefit incident to hospitality, companionship, or the like, the
passenger is a guest, but if the carriage tends to promote mutual interests of both
• . . the passenger is not within the meaning of such enactments.8 1
Acceptance, therefore, is an important element in the establishment of a
guest-host relationship. Some states, California for example, 2 expressly
include the word "accept" in their guest statute. Other states, by judicial
interpretation, have incorporated the word "accept" as part of their stat-
ute.A8  The prior criteria may be expressed in different ways. The Lou-
isiana Appellate Court in the case of Chanson v. Morgan's Louisiana
T.R. & S.S. Co.84 defined a guest as: "[a] person received and enter-
28. Supra note 3.
29. Supra note 3, at 30, 257 N.E.2d at 102 (Emphasis "added).
30. Connett v. Winget, supra note 17; followed in, Boyd v. Mueller, 320 Il1.
App. 303, 50 N.E.2d 847 (1943).
31. Connett v. Winget, supra note 17, at 534, 30 N.E.2d at 3.
32. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1960) which states: "No person who as
a guest accepts a ride . . . has any right of action for civil damages against the
driver . . . on account of personal injury . . . unless . . . such injury . . . proxi-
mately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of said driver."
(Emphasis added).
33. For cases in which the courts supply "acceptance" by interpretation: Fuller
v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941); Bailey v. Neale, 63 Ohio App.
62, 25 N.E.2d 310 (1939); Kudrna v. Adamski, supra note 21; see also Rocha v.
Hulen, supra note 18, the court also questioned whether a five-year-old child has
capacity to accept in any legal sense. This issue basically is what was decided in
the Rosenbaum case.
34. 18 La. App. 602, 136 So. 647 (1931).
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tained in the automobile of another. '35 These different definitions have
created some confusion in the courts as to who is a guest.
The first criterion has had its share of interpretational problems. There
is, of course, no problem when an individual is paying for a ride in a com-
mon carrier, e.g., a bus or a taxicab. Courts can readily determine that
this individual is a passenger, and not a guest. Courts do, however, have
difficulty when certain methods of "payment" are used by the rider in a
vehicle. 36  When dealing with carpools, the California court in Huebatter
v. Follett,3 7 held that, as a matter of law, a person who is riding under a
share-a-ride plan is a paying passenger, and not a guest. Three years
after this decision, the California Appellate Court, in Lyon v. Long
Beach"' refined the prior reasoning. The court decided that a rider's
status in a carpool is dependent upon whether the accident occurred dur-
ing a trip to or from work or on a subordinate trip.
Other problem areas are ventures wherein people share the expenses
of the trip. For instance, in California 39 and several other states40 courts
have held that sharing the cost of gas and oil on a vacation was nothing
more than a social amenity and was, therefore, not actual compensation;
as such, the rider was a guest. Washington courts have ruled that when
a trip is purely for a social purpose, the shared expense would not ele-
vate one to the status of a passenger. 41  But if it were for a non-social
purpose, then the shared expense might be considered compensation,
making the rider a passenger.
Who then bears the burden of proving the guest-host relationship vel
35. Id. at -, 136 So. at 649. In Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 CIN. L. REV. 24,
44 (1937), the author suggests that, "one, to be a guest, must not only be received
and entertained by another but must also have sufficient mental age to be able to
accept that hospitality with a realization that he is receiving a favor ... "
This theory was carried even farther by Richards, The Washington Guest Statute,
15 WASH. L. REV. 87 (1940). He contends that the capacity must be so that th
person who is going to assume the status of a guest realizes, appreciates and as-
sumes the risks involved in being a "guest" within the meaning of the statute.
36. The Illinois "guest statute," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2 § 9-201 (1969)
states: "[A]s a guest without payment." So determining whether a payment is
enough to take one out of the "guest statute" is a very important consideration.
37. 27 Cal. 2d 765, 167 P.2d 193 (1946).
38. 92 Cal. App. 2d 472, 207 P.2d 73 (1949).
39. See McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937).
40. Wagnon v. Patterson, 260 Ala. 297, 70 So. 2d 244 (1954); Brand v. Rorke,
225 Ark. 309, 280 S.W.2d 906 (1955); Loeffler v. Crandall, 129 Colo. 384, 270
P.2d 769 (1954); Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 280 P.2d 630 (1955).
41. Erickson v. Rossi, 65 Wash. 2d 155, 396 P.2d 170 (1964); McUne v. Fuqua,
42 Wash. 2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953); Hayes v. Brower, 39 Wash. 2d 372, 235 P.2d
482 (1951).
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non? This is an area in which most courts agree. In Miller v. Miller,42
an Illinois Supreme Court decision, the court stated: "Plaintiff alleged
a passenger-for-hire relationship, and the duty devolved upon him to show
that he actually paid for his transportation and was not, instead, 'a guest,
without payment'. '43 This view was followed in Burns v. Storchak,44
where the court stated: "The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to
produce evidence to show that plaintiff was not a guest. . . . "4 The
burden of proof, therefore, was on the plaintiff in both the Rosenbaum
and Ragon cases.4
The second criterion, i.e., acceptance, also has not been without its
share of interpretational difficulties. To whom and in what situations
did the legislature intend the guest statute to apply? When dealing with
consenting adults, courts universally state that, if the adult plaintiff has
met the first criterion, he is also capable of meeting the second. There-
fore, the guest would have to allege and prove more than ordinary negli-
gence in order to recover.
Even though courts have uniformly accepted the two well-established
criteria, they have, nevertheless, occasionally attempted to circumvent
their application by finding the facts of a particular case to be without
the meaning of the statute. In O'Donnell v. Mullaney,47 the California
court noted that the wording of the guest statute expressly required the
accident to occur on a highway. Section 360 of the California Vehicle
Code defined "highway" as a "public roadway." Because this accident
occurred on a private roadway, the guest statute did not apply.48 The
exceptions, however, as far as adults are concerned, are applied very in-
frequently.
Another problem area faced by the courts in their treatment of guest
statutes is the statutes' application to minors. Courts have solved this
problem to a certain extent by classifying minors into two categories:
those over seven years of age, and those seven or under-minors of tender
42. Supra note 17.
43. Supra note 17, at 288, 69 N.E.2d at 885.
44. 331 Ill. App. 347, 73 N.E.2d 168 (1947).
45. Id. at 351, 73 N.E.2d at 170.
46. Supra, note 3. See also Leonard v. Stone, 381 Il. 343, 45 N.E.2d 620
(1943); Weinrob v. Heintz, 346 I11. App. 30, 104 N.E.2d 534 (1952). See also
Fischer v. Ross, 79 Ill. App. 2d 372, 223 N.E.2d 722 (1967).
47. 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160 (1967).
48. See generally Comment: 41 So. CAL. L. REv. 884 (1968), where the author
shows the trend of judicial nullification of guest statutes throughout the country.
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years. 49  Courts as a general rule treat minors over seven according to
the same standard as adults. In Audia v. De Angelis,"° a Connecticut
court found that a fourteen year old was within the scope of the guest
statute. A similar decision was reached by a Washington court in the
case of Hart v. Hogan,5 which dealt with a twelve year old.
It is when dealing with minors of seven or under, however, that the true
nature of the problem is seen. In general, three lines of reasoning have
been used by the courts to except minors from the application of guest
statutes: 52 (1) the preferred status afforded to minors under the law;
(2) the legislative intent that minors are excepted from these statutes,
and (3) the incapacity of minors to accept a guest status.
Historically, minors of tender years have enjoyed a protected and
preferred status under the law. In criminal law cases, both under the
common law and by statute, preferential treatment has been awarded
to minors. At common law, children seven and under had no legal
capacity to commit a crime. 53  Illinois, in a change from the com-
mon law, has by statute extended the age of incapacity to thirteen.
5 4
Minors have also enjoyed a preferred status in the field of torts. Pro-
fessor Prosser, when dealing with the standard of conduct and the capacity
required of an individual for negligence55 or contributory negligence
states:56
As to one very important group of individuals, it has been necessary, as a practical
matter, to depart to a considerable extent from the objective standard of capacity.
... Although other limits have been set, those most commonly accepted are
taken over from the arbitrary rules of criminal law, as to the age at which children
are capable of crime. Below the age of seven, the child is arbitrarily held to be
incapable of any negligence.
5 7
49. Supra note 3, at -, 257 N.E.2d at 102, where the court refers to minors of
tender years.
50. 121 Conn. 336, 185 A. 78 (1936); see also Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75,
174 A. 323 (1934); contra, Kastel v. Stieber, 297 P.2d 932 (Cal. App. 1931), where
the court held their guest statute inapplicable to a minor eight years old.
51. 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 (1933).
52. See generally, infra notes 53-90.
53. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 837 (2nd Ed. 1969).
54. Infancy is a defense to a crime in Illinois. The infancy statute reads: "No
person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had attained his 13th birthday
at the time the offense was committed." ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 6-1
(Smith-Hurd 1964).
55. In Queens Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 374 Mich. 655, 132 N.W.2d 792 (1965),
the court felt a minor child under seven was incapable of negligence or an inten-
tional tort.
56. In Baker v. Alt, 374 Mich. 492, 132 N.W.2d 614 (1965), the court felt
that a minor under the age of seven was incapable of contributory negligence.
57. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 157-58 (3rd ed. 1964). For other authors us-
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This preferential treatment is often read into an analysis of legislative in-
tent to determine the status of a minor of tender years under a particular
statute.
After a law has been enacted, it is for the courts, in applying the
law, to determine the legislative intent prevailing at the time of passage.
In exercising this function, courts may either strictly or liberally construe a
law. In McDonald v. City of Spring Valley,58 a minor of seven years
was injured by the defendant municipality, but did not comply with the
six-month notice that was required by statute to preserve the cause of ac-
tion. The Illinois Supreme Court, finding that plaintiff was excused
from compliance with the six-month notice statute, stated:
Statutes general in their terms are frequently construed to contain exceptions, when
considered in connection with well-known rules of law, without courts being sub-
jected to the criticism of having entered the legislative field. . . . From time
immemorial the status of a minor of tender years has been recognized in the law to
be different from that of one of more mature years. . . .The recognition, by the
law, of the status of infants, and of their exemption up to a certain age from lia-
bility under the law, is so well known that it must be presumed that the Legislature,
in enacting the statute as the one under consideration, did not intend by the general
language used to include within its provisions a class of persons which the law has
universally recognized to be utterly devoid of responsibility. 59
In the Rosenbaum and Ragon cases6 ° this same reasoning was used when
the court determined that the legislative intent in passing the guest statute
was to exclude minors of tender years. 61
This same interpretation of legislative intent was used in the dissenting
opinion in In Re Wrights' Estate, 2 a Kansas case. In determining
whether the Kansas guest statute was intended by the legislature to apply
to a minor of tender years, this dissent declared:
Our judicial history is replete with instances of legislative acts and judicial decision
to the effect that a child is conclusively presumed to be non sui juris, incapable of
committing crime, not responsible for its torts, not guilty of contributory negligence
ing the same reasoning see generally Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of
Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618 (1927); Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane
Persons, 23 MICH. L. REv. 9 (1924); Wilderman, Contributory Negligence of
Infants, 10 IND. L.J. 427 (1935).
58. 285 Ill. 52, 120 N.E. 476 (1918).
59. Id. at 55, 120 N.E. at 477; this same reasoning was followed in, Costello
v. City of Aurora, 295 Ill. App. 510, 15 N.E.2d 38 (1938) when dealing with a
notice statute.
60. Supra note 3.
61. Supra note 3, at -, 257 N.E.2d at 102, where the court cites McDonald v.
City of Spring Valley.
62. 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951); see also Burhans v. Witbeck, 375
Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965), another case where the court felt that a child
as a matter of law is not a guest.
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and incapable of making a binding contract. In the light of these and many other
considerations given persons under a disability, can it now be said that our legislature
intended to eliminate the advantageous position that a child has heretofore enjoyed?
I think not. . . . Surely the law should not be construed to say that these helpless
children are bound by the same standards applicable to persons of mature years.
. . . It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of
tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. 68
By recognizing that the legislature must have realized the preferred status
that the law has historically attributed to minors and disabled persons,
courts have carved out exceptions for them, even though the statute with
which they were dealing did not expressly provide for such exceptions.
However, this same exception has not always been necessarily applied
in legislative interpretation of all statutes. The Indiana Supreme Court
in the case of Sherfey v. City of Brazil,64 considering the applicability of
a notice statute to preserve a cause of action, brought on behalf of a nine
year old against a municipality, declared: "neither infancy nor incapacity
can suspend the obligation to give statutory notice," 65 thus reaching a
result opposite that of the McDonald court. In Sims v. Cumby,6 6 Ar-
kansas held the notice requirement to apply to minors without any excep-
tion. The court stated:
We fully realize the hardships and injustice of the act, and would gladly, if in our
power, avert the evils that it threatens; but the legislature has enacted it in plain
terms, and we cannot modify or annul it by construction.67
Thus, this language shows the patent refusal by this court to deviate from
the express wording of the statute.
When dealing specifically with a guest statute, most jurisdictions have
exhibited an unwillingness to permit an exception for minors, which places
the dissenting opinion in In Re Wrights' Estate,68 and the decision in
Rosenbaum and Ragon69 in the minority. In Tilghman v. Rightor,7 0
an Arkansas court denied recovery in a guest statute case to a child of
seven. The court, in refusing to create an exception for minors, declared:
"It well [sic] be observed that in defining a guest the statute makes no
63. In re Wright's Estate, supra note 62, at 609, 228 P.2d at 917 (Emphasis
added).
64. 213 Ind. 493, 13 N.E.2d 568 (1938); for another case not distinguishing
between adults and minors, see Barcolini v. Atlantic City S.R. Co., 82 N.J.L. 107,
81 A. 494 (1911).
65. Sherfey v. City of Brazil, supra note 64, at 507, 13 N.E.2d at 574.
66. 53 Ark. 418, 14 S.W. 623 (1890).
67. id. at 422, 14 S.W. at 624.
68. Supra note 62.
69. Supra note 3.
70. 211 Ark. 229, 199 S.W.2d 943 (1947).
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exception in favor of minors and we have no authority to write that ex-
ception into the statute."'1  In Lynott v. Sells72 and Linn v. Nored,73
the Delaware and Texas courts followed suit. The Linn court specifically
stated: "It is quite generally held that a minor plaintiffs' tender years do
not take the case out of the statute, because the age does not affect the de-
gree of care required . ... 74 In retrospect, in looking at the examples
cited, one can readily see that courts, in exercising their discretionary
power of interpreting legislative intent, have generally lacked uniformity
in their decisions. Needless to say, this has created much confusion among
lawyers and judges.75
Another reason used by the courts in determining whether or not a
guest statute is applicable to a minor of tender years is whether the
requirements needed to obtain a guest-host relationship can be fulfilled.
Can a minor of tender years accept the status of a guest to create a
guest-host relationship?
In Green v. Jones,76 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that a two-
year old did not fall within the meaning of the applicable guest statute, and
declared:
We take judicial notice of the fact that a two-year old child is incompetent to
accept or reject an invitation. The status of "guest" under the statute is acquired
only by knowingly and voluntarily accepting the invitation to become so. 77
Since acceptance is a prerequisite to the establishment of a guest-host
relationship, this court recognized that a minor of tender years was in-
capable of becoming a guest. This same reasoning was expressed in
Fuller v. Thrun.78 Here, the Indiana Appellate Court found that the
guest statute did not apply to a minor of six, stating that such a child is
"presumed non sui juris and therefore incapable in law of accepting the
71. Id. at 232, 199 S.W.2d at 945.
72. 52 Del. 385, 158 A.2d 583 (1958). In Linn the court was dealing with a
5-year-old child. For other cases that rejected the exception as applied to minors
when a "guest statute" is involved, see Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323
(1934); Palden v. Crook, 342 Mass. 173, 172 N.E.2d 686 (1961); Mitzel v. Hauck,
78 S.D. 543, 105 N.W.2d 378 (1960); Ruett v. Nottingham, 200 Va. 722, 107
S.E.2d 402 (1959).
73. 133 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1939).
74. id. 133 S.W.2d at 236.
75. See generally, Comment, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 854 (1968); for a discussion
of the erosion of the application of the Illinois "guest statute" see generally, Com-
ment, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 263 (1959).
76. 136 Cal. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1958).
77. Id. at 517, 319 P.2d at 1086.
78. Supra note 33.
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appellant's invitation and hospitality, this invitation however, being neces-
sary in establishing a host-guest relationship."79
How then can the necessary criterion of acceptance be fulfilled by a
minor of tender years? Some courts have stated that parental consent,
either expressed or implied, creates the necessary acceptance for the es-
tablishment of a guest-host relationship. For example, in Buchner v. Vet-
terick,80 the California Appellate Court determined that the guest statute
was applicable to minors aged fifteen to twenty-six months. Since the
mother accompanied the children, they assumed the same status of the
mother. Thus, if she had been a guest, so were the children. However,
in Kudrna v. Adamski,81 the Oregon court stated that even though the
mother had accepted the status of a guest, this acceptance could not be
imputed to her four-year-old child. Even though the court did not ex-
pressly state that minors of tender years were excluded from the guest
statute, the requirement of acceptance rendered it impossible for a minor
to attain the status of a guest. The court stated that, to become a guest,
"one must exercise a choice in the matter . . . and we think that a four-
year-old child has not the legal capacity to exercise such a choice .... 82
The court decided that a minor of tender years as a matter of law could
not legally accept the status of a guest.
The above two cases indicate the doctrine of express parental consent,
possibly conferring the necessary criterion of acceptance on a minor of
tender years, thus creating the host-guest relationship. Other courts have
dealt with implied parental consent. In Morgan v. Anderson,"8 the
Kansas court held the guest statute applicable to a seven-year-old child.
The courts' reasoning was that the: "[w]eight of authority is that a minor
as well as an adult can be a 'guest,' even though unaccompanied by a par-
ent or guardian and even though no express consent of parent or guardian
has been shown."'8 4 Since the child was left in the unrestricted custody"
of the defendant, this was an implied parental consent; the court concluded
that necessary acceptance had been conferred on the minor and, therefore,
that he was a guest within the meaning of the statute. Another example
79. Supra note 33, at 413, 31 N.E.2d at 672.
80. 127 Cal. App. 2d 414, 269 P.2d 67 (1954). See also, Legislation Note,
41 IowA L. REV. 648, 655 (1956), the author feels that "necessary 'acceptance'
can be fulfilled by parental consent."
81. Supra note 21.
82. Kudrna v. Adamski, supra note 21, at 399, 216 P.2d at 263 (emphasis added).
83. 149 Kan. 814, 89 P.2d 866 (1939).
84. Id. at 817, 89 P.2d at 868.
85. Id. at -, 89 P.2d at 868, this unrestricted custody theory was also ex-
pressed in the majority opinion of, In re Wright's Estate, supra note 62.
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of the concept of implied parental consent is found in Balian v. Ogassin,6
where the Massachusetts court held that, even without express consent,
there was implied parental consent, which created a guest-host relation-
ship. The court declared: "Though there was evidence that his parents
did not expressly consent to the transportation by the defendant, author-
ized assent thereto by the temporary custodian, the childs' grandmother,
was not negatived. ' 8 7  In Whitfield v. Bruegel,88 an Indiana case, the
court also found the concept of implied parental consent to exist between
the father of a minor child and the defendant. Therefore, the court held
the guest statute applicable.
But in Kastel v. Stieber,8 9 the California Appellate Court found no im-
plied parental consent, hence no acceptance, and held that an eight-year-
old child does not fall within the meaning of the guest statute. Likewise,
in the case of Rocha v. Hulen,90 that same court, in dealing with a five-
year-old child, said that there was no express or implied consent, and
therefore no acceptance.
In the Rosenbaum and the Ragon cases,91 the court felt that not only
does a minor of tender years lack the requisite capacity to accept the
status of a guest, but also that the express or implied consent of a parent
will not confer such status on the minor.92 The court in utilizing a legis-
lative intent argument, determined that the Illinois legislature did not in-
tend the guest statute to apply in such a case. Because the case was de-
cided on these issues, the court did not deem it necessary to consider the
questions of constitutionality of the guest statute with regard to their appli-
cation. This case used all three arguments in finding an exception to the
guest statute for minors of tender years. In summary, they are: (1) the
preferred status of minors; (2) legislative intent; and (3) incapacity of
minors to accept the status.
By continuing to follow the lead of other courts which have found ex-
ceptions to guest statutes, the Rosenbaum-Ragon court perpetuates the
vacillation of court-created law, thus generating criticism among those
who would leave such matters to the legislature. Such criticism has
stemmed both from the academic world,93 and, strangely enough, from
86. Supra note 11.
87. Balian v. Ogassin, supra note 11, at 529, 179 N.E.at 234.
88. 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963).
89. 297 P. 932 (Cal. App. 1931).
90. Supra note 18.
91. Supra note 3.
92. Supra note 3, at 30, 257 N.E.2d at 103.
93. See also Comment, The Ohio Gutlst Statute, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 629 (1961);
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the judiciary, which itself creates such exceptions. Thus, in Clark v.
Clark,9 4 we find a judge stating:
Automobile guest statutes were enacted in about half of the states, in the 1920's
and early 1930's as a result of vigorous pressures by skillful proponents ...
New Hampshire never succumbed to this persuasion. No American state has newly
adopted a guest statute for many years. Courts of states which did adopt them are
today construing them much more narrowly, evidencing their dissatisfaction with
them.9 5
And writers echoing the same dissatisfaction state:
If courts are unwilling to declare guest statutes unconstitutional, they should apply
them in conformity with these expounded purposes and allow the legislature to es-
tablish criteria for recovery. This type of judicial administration would improve the
predictability necessary for attorneys, insurance companies, lower courts, drivers and
passengers. Possibly even more significant, it would allow the courts to write intel-
lectually honest opinions.96
This criticism may be harsh on the judiciary and its functioning, but laws
should not only be written with greater clarity but also interpreted with
greater uniformity and consistency.
The Rosenbaum and Ragon97 decisions have already been followed
to the letter by the Illinois Appellate Court in Cox v. Nicholas.9 8  But
their true significance lies elsewhere, for every exception carved out of a
statute weakens its effectiveness and destroys its vitality. Regardless of
the validity of the reasons behind these exceptions, and in spite of the
emotional appeal that lies in the allowance of recoveries to very young
children, legislative re-examination of the philosophy behind the guest
statutes is needed, either for total repeal, or for uniform exceptions to a
law so charged with a high propensity for needed change.
Aaron Taksin
Schantz, Oregon's Guest Statute, 1 WILLAMETTE L.J. 425 (1961); see also for
criticism of the "guest statute" and also judicial interpretation of "guest statutes"
supra note 75.
94. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
95. Id. at 356-57, 222 A.2d at 210.
96. Supra note 75, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 884, 898.
97. Supra note 3.
98. 122 Ill. App. 2d 252, 258 N.E.2d 394 (1970).
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Ala. Code tit. 36, § 95 (1958).
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-913, 914
(1947).
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-915 (1947).
Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158
(West 1960).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1
(1963).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6101
(1953).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 320.59 (1965).
Idaho Code Ann. §§ 49-1401,
1402 (1965 Cui. Supp.).
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95%, § 9-201
(1965).
Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 47-1021, 1022
(1965).
Iowa Code Ann. § 321.494
(1954).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-122(b)
(1963).
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 257.401
(Supp. 1956).
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 32-
113, 32-116 (1947).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-740 (1943).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.180 (1963).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-24-1, 2
(1953).
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 39-15-01
to 39-15-03 (1943).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4515.02
(Page 1953).
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.115 (1960).
S.C. Code Ann. § 46-801 (1962).
CRITERIA
Willful or wanton misconduct.
Willful or wanton operation in
disregard of the rights of others




Intoxication or willful miscon-
duct.
Intentional accident, intoxication
or willful and wanton disregard
of rights of others.
Intentional accident, or willful or
wanton disregard of the rights of
others.
Gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct.
Intentional accident or intoxica-
tion or gross negligence.
Willful and wanton misconduct.
Wanton or willful misconduct.
Driver under influence of intoxi-
cating liquor or reckless opera-
tion.
Gross and wanton negligence.
Gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct.
Grossly negligent and reckless
operation.
Intoxication or gross negligence.
Intoxication, willful misconduct
or gross negligence.
Intentional accident or heedless




Willful or wanton misconduct.
Intentional accident, gross negli-
gence or intoxication.
Intentional accident, heedlessness









S.D. Code § 44.0362 (Supp.
1960).
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6701(b) (1948).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-9-1, 2
(1953).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1491
(1959).
Willful and wanton misconduct.
Intentional accident, heedlessness
or reckless disregard of the rights
of others.
Intoxication or willful miscon-
duct.
Contract or receipt of pay for
carriage of occupant or injuries
are caused by gross or willful
negligence of the operator.
Va. Code Ann § 8-646.1 (1950). Gross negligence or willful and
wanton disregard of the safety of
occupant.
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § Intentional accident, gross negli-
46.08.080 (Supp. 1967). gence or intoxication. Proof of
cause of action must be corrobo-
rated by competent evidence or
testimony of parties to action.
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-233 (1957). Gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct.
